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Dream of one Pakistan with east and west ended up in a nightmare

With little inclination towards introspection Pakistanis generally brush off the event of 1971 as an Indian (read: Hindu) conspiracy to break up Pakistan. In this effort, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is projected as an Indian agent. Or that Operation Searchlight was the knee-jerk response of an alcoholic Pakistani army chief to kill Bengalis [spell: Bangalees], to the demands of the Awami League for their due share in power.

Furthermore, [military dictator] Yahya Khan had no intentions to transfer power to the elected representatives of the first national election conducted by his regime in December 1970.

Several accounts have been published in Pakistan strongly routing the above-mentioned myths. Regretfully this scribe has noticed that internationally acknowledged historians and scholars have written on East Pakistan [now Bangladesh] with a rudimentary knowledge of its long history or even the period when East Bengal was a part of Pakistan.

In this scribe’s opinion, the most authentic research work that has been produced is from a member of the Pakistan Civil Service, Hasan Zaheer. He not only served East Pakistan for six years in his initial career but was also posted back to Dacca [spell: Dhaka] in 1971. He went through two years of incarceration in India as a Prisoner of War (POW).

Going through this single book one would come to a definite conclusion that the grievances of the population of East Pakistan were not limited to language only, but covered broader aspects of political, social, and economic disinheritance, from day one. The Bengali frustrations did not emerge with the publication of the Six-Point Charter by the Awami League in February 1966 or exploded with their landslide victory in the 1970 elections.

A respected author and DAWN columnist, F. S. Aijazuddin wrote recently that Pakistan was a colonial power for 24 years. He could not have been more correct.

Before a few months of its fall, the [military dictator] Ayub [Khan] regime celebrated its ‘Decade of Development’ which continued for the entire year 1968.

Let us have a look at one facet of reality that has been quoted by G W Chaudhary, a professor of political science at Dacca University and a cabinet minister in the Yahya regime, from an international publication:

“In 1959–60, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32 per cent higher than in East Pakistan. Despite Ayub’s claim of having done his best to bridge the disparity, West Pakistan saw an annual growth rate of 6.2 per cent compared to 4.2 per cent for East Pakistan. When the ‘development decade’ was celebrated in 1967–68, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 61 per cent higher than that of East Pakistan. Thus, in 10 years of Ayub’s rule, the income disparity had more than doubled between the two wings of the country.

The 1970 elections and its fall out

Yahya Khan faced the devil’s alternative when the results of the 1970 elections emerged. Yahya and his Junta had expected a hung Parliament that they could manipulate to continue in power.

The result was however not only unexpected but shocking for the military regime. The elections were held on an LFO (Legal Framework Order) which had abolished the parity between East and West Pakistan existing since 1956. Since East Pakistan was the majority province it had 162 seats in the National Assembly as compared to 138 in West Pakistan out of a total of 300 in the House.

Awami League (AL) secured 160 out of 162 seats in East Pakistan. None in West Pakistan. Bhutto’s PPP secured 81 out of 138 seats in West Pakistan. Their electoral victory was basically in Sindh and Punjab. In N.W.F.P. [now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] it could secure only one seat and in Baluchistan none.

Nevertheless, he wanted to represent the whole of West Pakistan, which was not in reality a political entity after the dissolution of ‘One Unit’ following the LFO.

During mid-March 1971 when the proposal of two constitution committees, one each from East and West Pakistan was tabled, someone from Baluchistan quipped, why not five?

Awami League wanted the earliest inauguration of the National Assembly. Bhutto was against it because he insisted on an assurance that his party will share power in the Centre with Awami League. He was not prepared to sit in the opposition.

Awami League on the other hand was of the view that being the majority party, as a result of the election they were democratically entitled to form the government. They were open to including other political parties from East Pakistan, but not Bhutto’s PPP.

Yahya Khan wanted AL and PPP to sort out their differences before holding the National Assembly session. Bhutto would not bulge. Under pressure from AL, Yahya announced the convening of the National Assembly session in Dacca on March 03, 1971.

Bhutto refused to attend the NA session and threatened to break the legs of those who dared to fly to Dacca. He also threatened a lockdown in West Pakistan from Karachi to Torkham.

Yahya could not even afford a slap on the wrist of Bhutto given his long political association with his coterie of generals.

Postponement of NA session Sine Die

This was the point of no return for United Pakistan. From 1305 hrs. March 01, 1971, when the announcement was made affecting the postponement, Bangladesh was a reality and Pakistan could not have existed as had for the last 24 years. It would have made no difference if Operation Searchlight was not initiated in the early hours of March 26, 1971.

Bhutto’s political way forward after March 01, 1971

It appears that Bhutto had zero interest in the existence of Pakistan in any form as a single political entity.

He pursued his single-point agenda: The acquisition of power.

On March 10, 1971, sent a telegram to Mujib suggesting that, “The two wings of Pakistan must immediately reach a common understanding if the unity is to be saved.”

And a few days later he added further clarity by stating, “Because of the geographical separation (of East and West Pakistan) the majority rule does not apply.” And “Power should be transferred to both the majority parties.” What he implied and repeated subsequently as well was that he was perfectly at home in ruling West Pakistan while Mujib had his Bangladesh

Immediately on his landing in Karachi a day after Operation Searchlight was launched he made his infamous statement, “By the Grace of Almighty God, Pakistan has at last been saved”.

He had no notion that Bangladesh was a de facto reality effective 1305 hrs. March 01, 1971.

Sharjeel Javaid, who was born in Dhaka and studied in Shaheen School before repatriating with his parents to Pakistan, is an independent writer and researcher based in Karachi.

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